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Abstract
Margin Rules, Informed Trading in Derivatives and Price Dynamics
We analyze the impact of option trading and margin rules on the behavior of informed traders and
on the microstructure of stock and option markets. In the absence of binding margin requirements,
the introduction of an options market causes informed traders to exhibit a relative trading bias
towards the stock because of its greater information sensitivity. In turn, this widens the stock's
bid-ask spread. But when informed traders are subject to margin requirements, their bias towards
the stock is enhanced or mitigated depending on the leverage provided by the option relative to
the stock, leading to wider or narrower stock bid-ask spreads. The introduction of option trading,
with or without margin requirements, unambiguously improves the informational eciency of stock
prices. Margin rules improve market eciency when stock and option margins are suciently large
or small but not when they are of moderate size.
JEL Classication Code: G12, G14
1 Introduction
A number of empirical studies have studied the impact of derivatives trading on the market for the
underlying stock. The broad conclusions that have been drawn from these studies are that options
listing leads to a reduction in the volatility of stock returns, a reduction in stock bid-ask spreads,
and an increase in the informativeness of stock prices.
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In contrast to this abundance of empirical research, there are relatively few analytical models
that examine the impact of option trading on stock and option prices. Most derivative pricing
models assume complete markets where derivatives are redundant securities and hence not traded
in equilibrium. But when traders with private information about the underlying stock can choose
to trade the stock or the option, then option prices and trades contain valuable information and
are no longer redundant. For example, Grossman (1988) argues that even when options can be
synthetically replicated by dynamic trading strategies, their absence will prevent the transmittal
of information to market participants and lead to real eects such as more volatile stock prices.
Similarly, Back (1993) presents a model with asymmetrically informed traders and shows that the
introduction of an option causes the volatility of the underlying stock to become stochastic. Easley,
O'Hara and Srinivas (1998) develop and test a market microstructure model of informed traders who
can trade the stock or the option and present evidence of informed trading in the options market,
i.e., certain option trades contain information about future stock price movements. In a departure
from these models, Biais and Hillion (1994) examine the impact of option trading on an incomplete
market. They show that even though options trading mitigates the market breakdown problem
caused by asymmetric information and market incompleteness, its impact on the informational
eciency of the market is ambiguous. Brennan and Cao (1996) use a noisy rational expectations
model to demonstrate that the welfare gains that accrue to informed and uninformed traders from
multiple rounds of trading in a risky asset can be achieved in a single round of trading by introducing
1
For evidence on the reduction in volatility, see Conrad (1989) and Skinner (1989); on the reduction in bid-ask
spreads, see Damodaran and Lim (1991) and Fedenia and Grammatikos (1992); and on improved eciency, see
Damodaran and Lim (1991) and Jennings and Starks (1986). See Mayhew (1999) for a more exhaustive list of
references.
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a quadratic option.
A common deciency of the above-mentioned studies is that they ignore an important institu-
tional feature of modern markets { the presence of margin requirements when trading stocks and
options. When traders are not subject to wealth constraints, they maximize their trading prots
and margin requirements do not play a role in their optimal trading strategies. But in more realis-
tic settings where traders do face wealth constraints, the dierential margin requirements on these
securities can aect their trading strategies and the resulting equilibrium market prices. In this
paper, we take a rst step in this direction by explicitly characterizing the impact of margins on the
strategies of informed traders and on trading prices in the stock and options markets. We start by
postulating the existence of informed traders with noisy private signals, exogenous liquidity traders
and competitive market makers. We analyze the optimal trading strategies of the informed traders
and the equilibrium prices set by the market makers in three dierent settings:
 Trading is allowed only in the stock market (the ss scenario).
 Trading is allowed in the stock and options markets and margin requirements are not binding
(the so scenario).
 Trading is allowed in the stock and options markets and margin requirements are binding
(the sm scenario).
The advantage of this setup is that it allows us to examine both the impact of option trading
(by comparing the equilibria in the so and ss worlds) and the impact of margin requirements (by
comparing the equilibria in the sm and so worlds). We show that when option trading is allowed
without margin requirements, informed traders face a tradeo between trading too aggressively
in either market and facing larger trading costs (bid-ask spreads) in that market. In equilibrium,
they split their trades between the stock and the option although they exhibit a bias towards
the stock due to its greater information sensitivity compared with the option (since the option
delta is less than one). When stock and option margin requirements are added to the picture, the
leverage provided by the option may oset the information sensitivity edge of the stock and reduce
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or eliminate the informed traders' bias towards stock trading. We show that their optimal trading
strategy depends on the relative margin requirements in the two markets and consequently, bid
and ask prices in these markets will also be functions of these margin requirements.
We nd that the introduction of option trading improves the informational eciency of stock
prices irrespective of whether binding margin requirements are in place or not. Intuitively, even
though the addition of option trading enhances the ability of informed traders to disguise and prot
from their trades, the informativeness of the trading process is greater because the market can now
infer private information from two sources { order ow in the stock and option markets. However,
a comparison of the so and sm worlds reveals that the introduction of margin requirements has an
ambiguous eect on stock market eciency and we derive the sucient conditions for the eciency
of stock prices to be greater in the sm world than in the so world. These conditions suggest that
market eciency improves with margin requirements if these requirements for the stock and for
the option relative to the stock are either large or small. However, market eciency worsens when
these margins take on intermediate values.
On comparing the bid-ask spread for the stock in the ss and so worlds, we nd that the
introduction of option trading without margins increases the spread. Even though the option
market captures trading volume from both informed and liquidity traders, it captures relatively
less of the former given their bias towards stock trading. Thus, the relative threat of informed
trading in the stock market actually increases after the introduction of option trading, causing
the market maker to set wider spreads. But this bias does not survive when we introduce margin
requirements and we identify the conditions under which stock bid-ask spreads are smaller in the
sm world than in either the ss or so worlds. We nd that this occurs when stock margins are
relatively large and option margins are relatively small.
The impact of margin trading on stock markets is an issue of considerable interest to economists.
Garbade (1982) argues that margin trading can create destabilizing pyramid eects on stock prices.
Chowdhry and Nanda (1998) analytically conrm the validity of this conjecture by presenting a
model where margin trading induces market instability. However, the empirical evidence on this
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issue is mixed. Consistent with this hypothesis, Hardouvelis (1990) nds that curbing margin
trading by increasing margin requirements reduces stock volatility. However, Hsieh and Miller
(1990), Seguin and Jarrell (1993), and others nd that margin trading has no impact on stock
prices or volatility. At the other end of the spectrum, Seguin (1990) presents evidence of margin
trading reducing stock volatility and improving stock liquidity. These studies examine the eect
of margins in a single-asset framework. Our paper adds to this research stream by analyzing the
role of margins in a multi-asset (or multiple-market) setting. Specically, we examine how stock
and options margins aect trading strategies and prices in these two markets. This allows us to
generate empirical and policy implications on the impact of margin trading on interrelated markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic structure of the
model, derive the equilibrium for the ss case, and analyze its properties. In Section 3, we introduce
option trading into the picture (the so case), analyze the resulting equilibrium and compare it to
the ss case. In Section 4, we introduce binding stock and option margin requirements into the
picture (the sm case), analyze the resulting equilibrium and compare it to the ss and so cases.
Finally, we present the empirical predictions of our model and conclude in Section 5.
2 The Model With Only Stock Trading
In this section, we develop a trading model in the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) where agents
can trade only in the stock market and are not subject to margin constraints. The sole traded asset
in the market is a stock whose future value is uncertain. There are three types of traders in this
market: informed traders, liquidity traders and a market maker. All traders are assumed to be risk-
neutral and the risk-free interest rate is assumed to be zero. The informed traders receive private
signals about the stock's future value and trade based on this information. The liquidity traders
are uninformed and have exogenous motives for trade such as portfolio rebalancing. Their presence
is necessary to camouage the informed trades and avoid the no trade equilibrium of Milgrom and
Stokey (1982). The informed and liquidity traders trade with a competitive market maker who is
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assumed to set prices rationally.
The stock's per-share value ~v depends on the future state of the world . There are two possible
states of the world in the future, low (L) and high (H), that are equally likely to occur. The stock
values are given by v
L
and v
H
for  = L and  = H, respectively, where v
L
< v
H
. Therefore,
the unconditional expected value of the stock is v = (v
L
+ v
H
)=2. Although the future state of
the world is currently unobservable, the informed traders receive identical noisy private signals S
about , which is either good news (S = G) or bad news (S = B). The precision of this signal is
measured by the probability  that it is accurate about the state , i.e., Pr(S = G j  = H) =
Pr(S = B j  = L) = . Conversely, 1   measures the probability that the signal is inaccurate,
i.e., Pr(S = G j  = L) = Pr(S = B j  = H) = 1   . In order to ensure that the signal is
informative, we assume that  > 0:5. We also assume that  is common knowledge.
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The sequence of events in the model is as follows. At t = 0, the informed traders privately
observe a signal S about the future state . At t = 1, the informed and liquidity traders submit
their orders to a market maker who transacts a single, randomly selected order at his quoted bid
or ask price. At t = 2, the stock price adjusts to reect the information contained in the actual
trade that occured at t = 1. Finally, at some distant date t = 3, the state of the world  is realized
and publicly observed by all market participants. Note that trade occurs only on date 1 and there
is no trade on date 2. This date is introduced only as a modeling device to measure the amount of
information revealed by the date-1 trade.
The trading environment in the stock market has the following features. The market maker
randomly selects a single order to transact from among the orders submitted to him by the informed
and liquidity traders.
3
We denote the fraction of informed and liquidity traders in the market as
 and 1   , respectively. The liquidity traders are equally likely to submit buy or sell orders.
2
This assumption rules out the possibility of informed traders following a trading strategy where they manipulate
the market into thinking they are more or less informed than they really are.
3
Our single-trade convention is in keeping with the spirit of the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model where prices are
set on an order-by-order basis. Alternatively, we can follow the Admati and Peiderer (1989) convention wherein all
aggregated sell (buy) orders are transacted at a single bid (ask) price. We can conrm that our results are unchanged
under this alternative specication although the market eciency computations are considerably more messy.
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We assume that all traders submit orders of one share each.
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Informed traders are conjectured to
submit a buy order if they receive good news and a sell order if they receive bad news, i.e., their
conjectured trading strategy is given by
X
ss
(S) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
buy stock if S = G
sell stock if S = B
(1)
The market maker transacts a sell order at his quoted bid price B
ss
S
and a buy order at his
quoted ask price A
ss
S
.
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He sets his bid and ask prices competitively and rationally, i.e., so as to
make zero expected prots on each trade taking into account the information conveyed by the trade.
Therefore, he will set B
ss
S
= E(~v j stock sale) and A
ss
S
= E(~v j stock buy) where he conditions on
the information contained in the incoming order.
We dene the usual Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this market as comprising of the informed
trading strategy X
ss
(S) and the prices fB
ss
S
; A
ss
S
g that satisfy the following two conditions:
1. Given the market maker's prices fB
ss
S
; A
ss
S
g, the informed traders' strategy X
ss
(S) maximizes
their expected prots.
2. Given the informed trading strategy X
ss
(S), the market maker sets prices fB
ss
S
; A
ss
S
g so as
to make zero expected prots conditional on the incoming order.
The following proposition characterizes the resulting equilibrium in the ss world.
Proposition 1 In a world where only stock trading is allowed, the equilibrium informed trading
strategy X
ss
(S) is given by equation (1) and the equilibrium bid and ask prices are as follows:
B
ss
S
= v  
(2   1)(v
H
  v
L
)
2
(2)
A
ss
S
= v +
(2   1)(v
H
  v
L
)
2
(3)
4
The xed trade size assumption is standard in these microstructure models because the optimal trade size for
informed traders who take the bid and ask prices as given is innite. We can generalize our model to allow the
informed traders to choose from among multiple, exogenously specied trade sizes. However, this makes our analysis
much more cumbersome (since we now have to compute bid and ask prices for the stock and later, the option, at
each trade size) without adding much in the way of new insights.
5
The subscript S denotes that these are bid and ask prices for the stock and the superscript ss indicates that they
apply in a world where only stock trading is allowed (the ss scenario).
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Proof: See the Appendix.
The market maker breaks even on each incoming order by setting a spread between the bid and
ask prices. The spread allows him to recoup from the liquidity traders the losses suered at the
hands of the informed traders. The size of the spread is given by:

ss
S
= A
ss
S
 B
ss
S
= (2  1)(v
H
  v
L
) (4)
As expected, the size of the spread is increasing in  and . As  increases, informed traders form
a greater fraction of the trader population, which increases the threat of informed trading faced by
the market maker and he responds by setting a larger spread. Similarly, when  increases, informed
traders pose a greater threat to the market maker because they have more informative signals and
this leads to wider spreads.
We can also measure the eciency of stock prices as the amount of information revealed through
trading. Following Kyle (1985), we dene market eciency  as the fraction of the total variability
in stock value that is revealed by trading. In other words, it is the ratio of the variances of the
post-trade (date-2) stock price P
S;t=2
and the full information (date-3) stock price P
S;t=3
:
 =
Var(P
S;t=2
)
Var(P
S;t=3
)
(5)
Since the date-3 stock price is v
L
or v
H
with equal probabilities of 0.5, we can compute Var(P
S;t=3
) =
(v
H
  v
L
)
2
=4. The date-2 stock price is P
S;t=2
= B
ss
S
if the date-1 trade is a stock sale and the
date-2 price is P
S;t=2
= A
ss
S
if the date-1 trade is a stock purchase. Since the probabilities for the
state , the insider's signal S and liquidity sales/purchases are all symmetric, we can show that
Pr(stock sale) = Pr(stock buy) = 0:5, which implies that Var(P
S;t=2
) = 
2
(2  1)
2
(v
H
  v
L
)
2
=4.
Therefore, market eciency in the ss world is:

ss
= 
2
(2  1)
2
(6)
which is increasing in the amount of informed traders () and in the quality of their signals ().
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3 The Impact Of Option Trading
We now expand the model to consider the role of option trading (the so case). Suppose the traders
in our model have the choice of trading the stock or a put option on the stock with an exercise price
of K where v
L
< K < v
H
. The put option provides date-3 payos of K   v
L
and 0 for the states
 = L and  = H, respectively.
6
The sequence of events and the information structure is the same
as before except that the single trade transacted on date 1 can be in the stock or options market.
Furthermore, informed and liquidity traders now split their trades between the two markets, where
the split is exogenously specied for the latter and endogenously derived for the former. As before,
there are risk-neutral, competitive market makers in both markets who set prices rationally. These
market makers are assumed to observe the order ow in both markets when setting prices, which
rules out the possibility of arbitrage across markets.
Informed traders, who are a fraction  of the population, choose their strategy by trading o
the adverse selection costs of the stock and options market. If they trade too aggressively in one
market, the market maker in this market increases their trading cost by widening the spread, which
makes it advantageous for them to shift to the other market. Therefore, we conjecture that their
equilibrium strategy is a mixed one where they randomize their trading across both markets. We
denote their mixing probabilities of trading the stock and the put given a signal S 2 fB;Gg by 
so
S
and 1 
so
S
, respectively, where 
so
S
2 [0; 1] and pure strategies are feasible. When S = B, informed
traders are conjectured to either sell the stock or buy the put and their strategy is:
X
so
(B) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
sell stock with probability 
so
B
buy put with probability 1  
so
B
(7)
When S = G, they either buy the stock or sell the put and their conjectured strategy is:
X
so
(G) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
buy stock with probability 
so
G
sell put with probability 1  
so
G
(8)
6
Although we model a put option, we expect our qualitative results to stay unchanged if a call option is modeled
instead. Unfortunately, considerations of tractability, in terms of calculating the informed traders' optimal strategy,
prevent us from including both call and put option trading simultaneously.
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The fraction 1    of liquidity traders are themselves comprised of a fraction  who trade in
the stock market and a fraction 1    who trade in the options market (hedgers, for example).
Once again, we assume that the stock (option) liquidity traders are equally likely to buy and sell
shares (put options). The stock market maker sets the bid (B
so
S
) and ask (A
so
S
) prices for the stock
so as to make zero expected prots taking into account the information conveyed by the stock
trade, i.e., B
so
S
= E(~v j stock sale) and A
so
S
= E(~v j stock buy). Similarly, the options market
maker sets the bid (B
so
P
) and ask (A
so
P
) prices for the put so as to make zero expected prots
conditional on the information conveyed by the option trade, i.e., B
so
P
= E[(K   ~v)
+
j put sale]
and A
so
P
= E[(K   ~v)
+
j put buy]. The following lemma characterizes these bid and ask prices as
functions of informed traders' conjectured strategy f
so
B
; 
so
G
g:
Lemma 1 The zero-prot bid and ask prices set by the stock and options market makers conditional
on the informed traders' conjectured trading strategy in equations (7) and (8) are:
B
so
S
= v  

so
B
(2  1)(v
H
  v
L
)
2(1  ) + 2
so
B
(9)
A
so
S
= v +

so
G
(2  1)(v
H
  v
L
)
2(1  ) + 2
so
G
(10)
B
so
P
=
(K   v
L
)[(1   )(1  ) + 2(1   )(1  
so
G
)]
2(1   )(1   ) + 2(1   
so
G
)
(11)
A
so
P
=
(K   v
L
)[(1   )(1  ) + 2(1   
so
B
)]
2(1   )(1   ) + 2(1   
so
B
)
(12)
Proof: See the Appendix.
In equilibrium, the informed traders choose a trading strategy that maximizes their prots given
on the above prices in the two markets. If they receive the S = B signal, their expected prots
from selling the stock is B
so
S
 E(~v j S = B) and from buying the put is E[(K  ~v)
+
j S = B] A
so
P
.
If they receive the S = G signal, their expected prots from buying the stock is E(~v j S = G) A
so
S
and from selling the put is B
so
P
 E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = G]. Since they are conjectured to mix between
the stock and the option, they choose 
so
B
and 
so
G
in equilibrium so as to equalize their trading
prots across these two markets. The following proposition characterizes this equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In a world where stock and option trading is allowed, the equilibrium informed
9
trading strategy fX
so
(B);X
so
(G)g is given by equations (7) and (8) and the equilibrium prices are
given by equations (9){(12), where 0 < 
so
B
= 
so
G
< 1 if
v
H
  v
L
K   v
L
< 1 +

(1   )
where

so
B
= 
so
G
=
[(1   )(1   )(v
H
 K) + (v
H
  v
L
)]
[(1  )(K   v
L
) + (v
H
  v
L
)]
(13)
But the equilibrium informed trading strategy is 
so
B
= 
so
G
= 1 if
v
H
  v
L
K   v
L
 1 +

(1  )
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Since 
so
B
= 
so
G
= 
so
, informed traders trade with the same intensity whether they get good or
bad news. This symmetry follows from two assumptions in our model: the  = L and  = H states
are equally likely and the S = B and S = G signals have the same precision . Since the variability
of the stock (v
H
 v
L
) exceeds that of the put option (K v
L
), informed traders prefer to trade the
stock rather than the put, because their private information is more valuable when they trade the
more volatile security. In other words, informed traders prefer to trade the stock because it is more
information-sensitive than the option. We can measure this information advantage of the stock
over the option by the ratio of their respective volatilities
v
H
  v
L
K   v
L
, which in our model is just the
inverse of the put's delta or hedge ratio. The above proposition tells us that informed traders will
mix between the stock and put if the stock's information advantage is not too large. However, if
this information edge exceeds a certain threshold, they will switch to a pure strategy of trading only
the stock.
7
This threshold value is decreasing in the intensity of stock liquidity trading () because
when  is high, informed traders nd stock trading to be more protable (due to the availability
of more camouage) and this makes the stock-only pure strategy more likely to occur.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium (which is our focus for the remainder of this section), even
though the informed trade in both markets, they still exhibit a relative bias towards the stock.
In order to see this, note that when we move from the ss to the so world by introducing option
trading, liquidity traders now split their trades between the stock and the put and their stock trading
probability reduces from 1 to . However, the stock trading probability of informed traders reduces
7
Not surprisingly, an equilibrium where the informed traders trade only the option (
so
B
= 
so
G
= 0) does not exist
because that requires the option to be more information-sensitive than the stock, i.e., have a delta in excess of one,
which is not possible.
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from 1 to 
so
, where we can infer from equation (13) that 
so
> . Therefore, the informed traders'
stock trading intensity relative to that of the liquidity traders increases after the introduction of
option trading. This stock trading bias of informed traders is a direct result of stock's greater
information sensitivity because if K = v
H
, the put's delta is one and we can see from equation (13)
that 
so
= . The comparative statics properties of 
so
are described in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The stock trading intensity of the informed traders 
so
is increasing in , decreasing
in  and K, and independent of .
Proof: See the Appendix.
These results have an appealing intuition. Informed traders trade more aggressively in the stock
market when stock liquidity trading () increases because they have more liquidity traders to
prot from. But when  increases, the market makers in both markets are more wary of informed
trading in their respective order ows and this reduces the informed traders' expected prots in
both markets. However, this reduction is greater in the stock market given its greater information
sensitivity and so they shift their trading to the relatively more protable option market, which leads
to a decrease in 
so
. Similarly, an increase in K increases the option's delta and consequently, its
information sensitivity. This reduces the stock's information edge and informed traders respond by
trading the stock less intensively. Finally, an increase in signal precision  increases the information
advantage of the informed traders. We would expect them to respond by increasing their trading
intensity in the more information-sensitive stock market (an increase in 
so
). However, an increase
in  causes the stock market maker to widen his bid-ask spread more than the option market maker
given the former's greater information sensitivity, which induces informed traders to reduce their
stock trading intensity (a decrease in 
so
). In equilibrium, these two eects exactly oset each
other leaving 
so
unchanged.
We now calculate the equilibrium bid-ask spreads in the two markets. On substituting the value
for 
so
from equation (13) into the bid and ask price expressions in equations (9){(12), we get

so
S
= A
so
S
 B
so
S
= (2  1)[(v
H
  v
L
) + (1  )(1   )(v
H
 K)] (14)
11
so
P
= A
so
P
 B
so
P
= (2  1)[(K   v
L
)  (1   )(v
H
 K)] (15)
Given the informed traders' bias towards trading the stock rather than the option, it is not sur-
prising that the stock market maker sets a wider spread than his option counterpart (
so
S
> 
so
P
).
Furthermore, a comparison of equations (4) and (14) reveals that 
so
S
> 
ss
S
, i.e., the introduction
of option trading leads to wider bid-ask spreads in the underlying stock. As noted earlier the mar-
ket maker in the stock faces an increased threat of informed trading (relative to liquidity trading)
following the introduction of the option because 
so
>  and he responds by setting a wider bid-ask
spread. We present the properties of these bid-ask spreads in the following corollary:
8
Corollary 2 The stock's bid-ask spread 
so
S
is increasing in  and  and decreasing in  and K.
The option's bid-ask spread 
so
P
is increasing in , , and K and decreasing in .
Intuitively, increases in  or  imply that both market makers face a greater threat from informed
traders, either because they are more likely to trade with them or because these traders have better
information and so they defend themselves by setting wider bid-ask spreads. An increase in 
increases the stock-trading intensity of liquidity traders and reduces the option-trading intensity of
informed traders (1   
so
), which causes both market makers to narrow their spreads. Finally, an
increase in K causes informed traders to shift their trading from the stock to the option (because of
latter's increased information sensitivity) and the stock (option) market maker responds by setting
a smaller (larger) spread.
Once again, we can measure the amount of information revealed through the trading process
(market eciency) using equation (5). The stock price on date 2 after the completion of trading,
P
S;t=2
, reects the information conveyed by the date-1 trade, whether it is in the stock or the option
market. We calculate the market eciency 
so
in the following proposition and demonstrate that
it exceeds the ss world's market eciency.
Proposition 3 When option trading is introduced, the informational eciency of stock prices is
8
We omit the proof to conserve space although it follows from a straightforward computation of partial derivatives
of 
so
S
and 
so
P
with respect to the relevant variables.
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given by:

so
= 
2
(2  1)
2
"
(
so
)
2
(1  ) + 
so
+
(1  
so
)
2
(1  )(1   ) + (1  
so
)
#
(16)
where 
so
is as per equation (13). Furthermore, stock prices are more ecient than in a world with
only stock trading, i.e., 
so
> 
ss
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The nding that the introduction of option trading improves stock market eciency is an intuitive
one. In the so world, informed traders randomize their trading across both the stock and the
option. Therefore, the market can now noisily infer their private information from two sources {
the order ows in the stock and options markets. As a result, more of their private information is
revealed in the trading process and market eciency improves relative to the ss world.
4 The Impact of Margin Requirements
We now introduce margin requirements into our model of stock and option trading and consider
their impact on trading strategies and market prices. Our analysis so far assumes that informed
traders are not subject to wealth constraints and they trade to maximize prots. Margin require-
ments do not inuence their trading strategies in this setting. But in the real world most traders
face wealth constraints and we will analyze the behavior of these traders in this section (the sm
world). Margin rules have a natural role to play in this setting because wealth-constrained informed
traders seek to maximize the expected return, rather than expected prot, from trading.
The structure of the model is the same as in Section 3 but with informed traders now subject
to initial margin requirements. The stock and option margin requirements are modeled as follows:
1. To buy or sell a share of stock, a trader has to invest a fraction m
S
of the ask or bid price,
respectively.
2. To buy an option, a trader has to invest 100% of the ask price, i.e., options cannot be bought
on margin because they are already highly leveraged.
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3. To sell an option, a trader has to invest a fraction m
P
of the underlying stock price less the
amount (if any) by which the option is out of the money.
These rules broadly conform to regulations in the United States where m
S
= 50% and m
P
= 20%
currently. As before, the informed traders' mixed trading strategy is given by equations (7) and (8),
where the mixing probabilities are now denoted by f
sm
B
; 
sm
G
g. Given this trading strategy, the bid
and ask prices in the two markets are once again given by equations (9){(12) with the appropriate
mixing probabilities now being 
sm
S
rather than 
so
S
. The informed traders choose f
sm
B
; 
sm
G
g in
equilibrium so as to maximize their expected return conditional on the above prices. When they
receive the S = B signal, their expected return from selling the stock is
B
sm
S
 E(~v j S = B)
m
S
B
sm
S
and
their expected return from buying the put is
E

(K   ~v)
+
j S = B

 A
sm
P
A
sm
P
. But when they receive
the S = G signal, their expected return from buying the stock is
E(~v j S = G) A
sm
S
m
S
A
sm
S
and their
expected return from selling the put is
B
sm
P
 E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = G]
m
P
E(~v j put sale)
assuming that the put is in the
money.
9
We now characterize the equilibrium for this model in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In a world with stock and option trading and binding margin requirements, the
equilibrium informed trading strategy fX
sm
(B);X
sm
(G)g is given by equations (7) and (8) and the
equilibrium prices are given by equations (9){(12), where the mixing probabilities are

sm
B
=

2

(v
H
  v
L
)	
1
 m
S
	
2
m
S
(1  )[v
L
+ v
H
(1  )] + (v
H
  v
L
)

(17)

sm
G
=

2

m
P
(v
H
  v
L
)
1
 m
S
(K   v
L
)
2
[v
H
+ v
L
(1  )][m
P
(v
H
  v
L
) +m
S
(1  )(K   v
L
)]

(18)
where 	
1
= (1   )(1   ) + 2; 
1
= (1   )(1   )(v
L
+ v
H
) + 2[v
H
+ v
L
(1   )]; and
	
2
= 
2
= (1   )(1   )(v
L
+ v
H
). The mixed strategy equilibrium exists if and only if the
following conditions are satised:
(1  )
(1  )(v
L
+ v
H
) + 2[v
L
+ v
H
(1  )]
< (
m
S
v
H
  v
L
) <
	
1
	
2
(19)
9
When the solitary trade in our model is a put sale, the stock market maker rationally sets the stock price to be
E(~v j put sale) and the informed trader's put margin is a fraction m
P
of this price. We assume that the put is in
the money in this situation, i.e., K > E(~v j put sale), in order to greatly simplify the algebra. This is a fairly trivial
assumption and we can conrm that all qualitative results in this section continue to hold even when the put is out of
the money. Furthermore, on substituting from equation (A.8) in the Appendix, we can see that a sucient condition
for the put to be in the money is K > v
H
+ v
L
(1  ), which we will assume is satised in this section.
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(1  )(v
L
+ v
H
)
(1  )(v
L
+ v
H
) + 2[v
H
+ v
L
(1  )]
< (
m
S
m
P
)(
K   v
L
v
H
  v
L
) <

1

2
(20)
When the left (right) hand side inequalities in equations (19) and (20) are reversed, the informed
traders trade only in the stock (option) market (
sm
B
= 
sm
G
= 1(0)).
Proof: See the Appendix.
In contrast to the previous section, the trading intensity of informed traders is no longer symmetric
in the mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e., 
sm
B
6= 
sm
G
. This is because of the asymmetry in margin
requirements between the stock and the option (m
S
6= m
P
) and also because options can only be
sold, not bought, on margin. In order to understand the economic intuition underlying the above
proposition, we must understand the tradeos faced by the informed agents. Ceteris paribus, they
prefer to exploit their private information in the stock market rather than in the option market
because of the former's greater information sensitivity. However, given their limited wealth, they
prefer to trade in the market with the smaller margin requirements in order to increase their leverage
and maximize their returns. Further complicating their decision is the fact that if they trade too
aggressively in one or the other market to capitalize on its information or margin edge, they will
face wider bid-ask spreads in that market. To see these tradeos in action, consider their strategy
when S = G. The ratios m
S
=m
P
and (K   v
L
)=(v
H
  v
L
) measure the leverage advantage and
information sensitivity, respectively, of the option relative to the stock. When either or both of
these ratios are large enough so that their product exceeds the threshold 
1
=
2
, then it is more
advantageous for them to trade the option and so 
sm
G
= 0. But if the product is very small, then
the stock is their preferred instrument and they set 
sm
G
= 1. For intermediate values, they adopt
a mixed strategy of trading the stock (option) with probability 
sm
G
(1  
sm
G
) where 
sm
G
2 f0; 1g.
Similarly, when S = B, the relative benet of trading the put for the informed traders is now
measured by the ratio m
S
=(v
H
  v
L
) and they trade the put, the stock or mix between the two for
high, low and intermediate values, respectively, of this ratio.
10
The threshold values in equations
10
Since the put cannot be bought on margin, the relative benet of trading the put is positively related to the
stock's margin requirement m
S
(which determines the amount of leverage in the stock) and negatively related to the
stock's volatility (which determines its information edge over the option).
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(19) and (20) are functions of  and  and they reect the sensitivities of the stock and options
market makers to their respective adverse selection problems. An implication of these arguments
is that with margin requirements, informed traders may only trade the option in equilibrium (if it
provides substantially more leverage than the stock), which was not possible in Section 3.
In the remainder of this section, we will focus on the mixed strategy equilibrium and compare
it to the one that exists when margin rules are absent (Proposition 2). We start by comparing the
informed traders' strategies in the two settings. We can show using equations (13), (17) and (18)
that the sucient and necessary conditions for 
sm
B
> 
so
B
and 
sm
G
> 
so
G
arem
S
< ,
1
(v
H
 v
L
) and
m
P
m
S
> ,
2
(K v
L
), respectively, where ,
1
and ,
2
are functions of the model parameters.
11
In other
words, the stock trading intensity of informed traders is greater with margin requirements than
without if and only if the stock margin is suciently "small" and the option margin is suciently
"large" relative to the stock margin. Under these conditions, the leverage advantage of the stock
relative to the option is large enough to induce informed traders to trade the stock more aggressively.
We can also compare the comparative statics properties of 
sm
as described in the following corollary
to those of 
so
(Corollary 1).
Corollary 3 The stock trading intensity of informed traders f
sm
B
; 
sm
G
g are such that
1. 
sm
B
is increasing in  and , decreasing in m
S
, increasing (decreasing) in  if m
S
=(v
H
 v
L
) >
(<) (v
L
+ v
H
)
 1
, and independent of K and m
P
.
2. 
sm
G
is increasing in  and m
P
, decreasing in K and m
S
, and increasing (decreasing) in 
and  if m
S
(K   v
L
)=m
P
(v
H
  v
L
) > (<) 1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
As before, informed traders intensify their trading in the stock when stock liquidity trading ()
11
Straightforward, though tedious, algebra gives us the expressions for  
1
and  
2
as follows:
 
1
=
(1  + 2)(K   v
L
)  (1  )(2  1)(v
H
 K)
(1  )(v
L
+ v
H
)[(v
H
 K) + (K   v
L
)] + 2[v
L
+ v
H
(1  )][(v
H
  v
L
) + (1  )(1  )(v
H
 K)]
 
2
=
(v
L
+ v
H
) + (2  1)[(K   v
L
) + (1   + )(v
H
 K)]
(v
L
+ v
H
)(K   v
L
) + (2  1)(v
H
  v
L
)[(K   v
L
)  (1  )(v
H
 K)]
It is easy to check that  
1
and  
2
satisfy the feasibility equations (19) and (20).
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increases because of the resulting increase in the protability the stock relative to the option.
Another familiar result is the negative relationship between 
sm
G
and K { an increase in the strike
price increases the put's delta and its information sensitivity, which causes informed traders to
shift to the option and away from the stock. However,
@
sm
B
@K
= 0 because the informed traders'
return from buying the put with bad news is independent of K. An increase in K increases both
their prot from buying the put and the put's purchase (ask) price, leaving their return unchanged
and thus, they are not more or less eager to trade the option. The relationship between stock
trading intensity and  highlights an important distinction between the sm and so worlds. In the
so world, 
so
is negatively related to  but the relationship between 
sm
and  can be positive or
negative depending on parameter values. When  increases, market makers in both markets face
an increased threat of informed trading and respond by setting prices accordingly. However, the
market maker in the informed traders' preferred security has a relatively stronger response given
his greater susceptibility to this threat and therefore, informed traders rationally react by shifting
to the less preferred security. The security preference of informed traders depends on two factors -
its information sensitivity and its leverage advantage. As we saw earlier, the ratios (
m
S
m
P
)(
K   v
L
v
H
  v
L
)
and
m
S
v
H
  v
L
measure the net benet to informed traders of trading the put instead of the stock.
The above corollary tells us that if these two ratios are suciently "large",
@
sm
@
> 0 because the
market maker in the option (the preferred security) reacts more sharply to the increase in  and
so the informed traders increase their stock trading intensity in response. In contrast, the stock is
always the preferred instrument for informed traders in the so world (given its greater information
sensitivity) and an increase in  leads them to shift away from it and towards the option.
Another dierence between the so and sm worlds is in the diering responses of informed traders
to a change in . When  increases, informed traders face two conicting incentives. On the one
hand, they want to capitalize on their higher quality signal by trading their preferred security more
aggressively. On the other hand, they recognize that the preferred security's market maker responds
more sharply to the increased threat of informed trading caused by the higher  (given his greater
sensitivity to this threat) and this will cause them to trade the less-preferred security. In the so
17
world, these two eects exactly oset each other. In the sm world, the former eect dominates the
latter when informed traders receive bad news (
@
sm
B
@
> 0). Informed traders with more precise
bad news signals trade the stock more aggressively because it is more information-sensitive than
the option and because the option's leverage advantage is minimal (since informed traders with bad
news cannot buy the put on margin). But the latter eect dominates the former when informed
traders receive good news because
@
sm
G
@
> (<) 0 when the option (stock) is their preferred security,
i.e., when (
m
S
m
P
)(
K   v
L
v
H
  v
L
) is suciently large (small).
Corollary 3 also reports on the sensitivity of the informed traders' strategy to the stock and
option margin requirements. Informed traders respond to an increase in the stock margin by trading
the option more aggressively (
@
sm
@m
S
< 0 ) because the relative leverage advantage of the option
increases when m
S
increases. Similarly, an increase in the option margin reduces the option's
leverage edge and leads informed traders to trade the stock more aggressively (
@
sm
G
@m
P
> 0).
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We now calculate the equilibrium bid-ask spreads in the sm world and compare them to those
in the ss and so worlds. From equations (9){(12), the stock and option bid-ask spreads are:

sm
S
=
(2  1)(v
H
  v
L
)[(1  )(
sm
B
+ 
sm
G
) + 2
sm
B

sm
G
]
2[(1   ) + 
sm
B
][(1   ) + 
sm
G
]
(21)

sm
P
=
(2  1)(K   v
L
)[(1   )(1   )(2   
sm
B
  
sm
G
) + 2(1   
sm
B
)(1  
sm
G
)]
2[(1   )(1   ) + (1   
sm
B
)][(1   )(1   ) + (1   
sm
G
)]
(22)
where 
sm
B
and 
sm
G
are given by equations (17) and (18), respectively. From equations (4), (14)
and (21), we can show that

sm
S
 
ss
S
=
(1   )(2  1)(v
H
  v
L
)f
G
X
S=B
(
sm
S
  )[(1   ) + 
sm
S
0
]g
2[(1   ) + 
sm
B
][(1   ) + 
sm
G
]

sm
S
 
so
S
=
(1   )(2   1)(v
H
  v
L
)f
G
X
S=B
(
sm
S
  
so
)[(1   ) + 
sm
S
0
]g
2[(1   ) + 
sm
B
][(1   ) + 
sm
G
][(1  ) + 
so
]
where S
0
= G(B) when S = B(G). Therefore, 
sm
S
< (>) 
ss
S
if 
sm
B
< (>)  and 
sm
G
< (>) .
Intuitively, the stock market maker narrows (widens) the spread when option trading with margins
12
Since informed traders cannot buy the put on margin, their trading strategy with bad news is independent of
m
P
, i.e.,
@
sm
B
@m
P
= 0.
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is introduced if he faces an decreased (increased) risk of trading with informed traders relative to
liquidity traders. In contrast to the so world where this risk is always greater (
so
> ) and option
trading leads to wider stock spreads, in the sm world, the risk can be more or less depending on
tradeo between leverage and information sensitivity in the two markets. We can also infer from
the above equations that 
sm
S
< (>) 
so
S
if 
sm
B
< (>) 
so
and 
sm
G
< (>) 
so
. As expected, stock
spreads are narrower (wider) in the sm world than in the so world if informed traders trade the
stock less aggressively with margins. Since we showed earlier that 
so
>  and 
so
S
> 
ss
S
, only
one of these two sets of sucient conditions are binding, i.e., 
sm
S
< 
ss
S
< 
so
S
if 
sm
B
<  and

sm
G
<  and 
sm
S
> 
so
S
> 
ss
S
if 
sm
B
> 
so
and 
sm
G
> 
so
. On substituting for the equilibrium
values of 
so
, 
sm
B
and 
sm
G
and simplifying, we can show that
1. The stock bid-ask spread is lower in the sm case than in the ss or so cases if
m
P
m
S
<
K   v
L
v
H
  v
L
and m
S
>
(1  + 2)(v
H
  v
L
)
(v
L
+ v
H
)  (2   1)(v
H
  v
L
)
.
2. The stock bid-ask spread is greater in the sm case than in the ss or so cases if
m
P
m
S
> ,
2
(K v
L
)
and m
S
< ,
1
(v
H
  v
L
) where ,
1
and ,
2
were dened earlier in footnote 11.
These conditions have a straightforward explanation. When stock margins are large and option
margins are small relative to stock margins, informed traders trade the option more intensively
given its leverage advantage and the resulting reduced threat of informed trading in the stock
market lowers the bid-ask spread there compared to the ss and so cases. Conversely, when stock
margins are small and option margins are relatively large, informed traders shift their trading to the
stock and the market maker responds by setting large stock spreads. We can derive the properties
of the stock and option spreads in the sm world by computing the partial derivatives of 
sm
S
and

sm
P
with respect to the model parameters and the results are described in the following corollary.
Corollary 4 The stock's bid-ask spread 
sm
S
increases with ,  and m
P
, decreases with K and
m
S
, and is ambiguous with respect to . The option's bid-ask spread 
sm
P
increases with  and m
S
,
decreases with m
P
, and is ambiguous with respect to ,  and K.
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As in the so world, an increase in  increases bid-ask spreads in both markets because market makers
face a greater adverse selection problem when the fraction of informed traders in the population
increases. The comparative statics of 
sm
S
with respect to  and K are also unchanged from the so
world and for essentially the same reasons. But whereas  and K have a positive impact on 
so
P
,
their impact on 
sm
P
is ambiguous. Intuitively, an increase in  has two conicting eects on the
option market maker. On the one hand, it worsens his adverse selection problem since he is trading
against better-informed traders and this should cause him to widen the spread by increasing A
sm
P
and decreasing B
sm
P
. On the other hand, Corollary 3 tells us that informed traders are less likely
to buy the put with bad news and this should cause the market maker to lower A
sm
P
. As a result
of these conicting eects,
@
sm
P
@
can be positive or negative.
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Similarly,
@
so
P
@K
can be positive
or negative because K has an ambiguous eect on B
sm
P
. An increase in K leaves the put more
in-the-money and simultaneously increases the likelihood that informed traders with good news
will sell the put (
@
sm
G
@K
< 0 from Corollary 3). The former eect tends to increase B
sm
P
and the
latter eect tends to reduce it leaving an ambiguous net eect. In the so world, we can show that
an increase in K increases B
so
P
because the former eect dominates the latter. However, K has an
even larger positive eect on A
so
P
because both eects work in the same direction now and the net
eect of K on the spread is unambiguously positive. While K has a positive eect on A
sm
P
too,
this eect is smaller because it stems solely from the increased in-the-moneyness of the put (since
@
sm
B
@K
= 0 from Corollary 3) and it is not enough to overcome the ambiguous eect on B
sm
P
.
Another contrast between the so and sm worlds is in the relationship between spreads and the
liquidity trading parameter . This relationship is negative for both markets in the so world but can
be positive or negative in the sm world. The reason for this ambiguity is as follows. Ceteris paribus,
an increase in stock liquidity trading () causes the stock (option) market maker to narrow (widen)
his spread. But of course, everything else does not stay constant when  increases. Specically,
informed traders trade the stock (option) more (less) aggressively when  increases (Corollary 3)
13
The latter feedback eect of  on the informed trader's strategy is absent in the so world because we know from
Corollary 1 that
@
so
@
= 0 and that explains why
@
so
P
@
is unambiguously positive.
20
and this induces the stock (option) market maker to widen (narrow) the spread, leaving the net
impact ambiguous. Finally, the comparative static results on m
S
and m
P
have a ready intuition.
When the stock margin requirement m
S
increases, informed traders shift some of their trading
to the more-leveraged option, which leads the stock (option) market maker to narrow (widen) his
spread. Similarly, an increase in m
P
causes informed traders to shift to the stock and this has the
opposite eect on stock and option spreads.
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Finally, we measure the amount of information revealed by trading, or market eciency, in the
sm case (
sm
) using equation (5). The derivation of 
sm
is analogous to that of 
so
in equation
(16) and we get:

sm
=

2
(2  1)
2
(
sm
B
+ 
sm
G
)
2
(23)
where 
sm
S
=
(
sm
S
)
2
(1  ) + 
sm
S
+
(1  
sm
S
)
2
(1  )(1   ) + (1   
sm
S
)
for S 2 fB;Gg (24)
where 
sm
S
is given by equations (17) and (18). Simple algebraic calculations reveal that 
sm
S
>
1 which implies that 
sm
> 
ss
from equations (6) and (23). Therefore, the introduction of
option trading improves market eciency even with binding margin requirements because market
participants can infer information not only from stock trades but also from option trades.
But when we compare 
so
to 
sm
using equations (16) and (23), we cannot unambiguously
conclude that margin rules improve or worsen market eciency. We can see that 
sm
> 
so
if

sm
B
> 
so
B
and 
sm
G
> 
so
G
where f
j
S
;S 2 (B;G); j 2 (sm; so)g is dened in equation (24). On
substituting for the relevant mixing probabilities 
j
B
in the above expression for 
j
B
, we can show
after some tedious algebra that 
sm
B
> 
so
B
if m
S
< ,
1
(v
H
  v
L
) or if m
S
> ,
3
(v
H
  v
L
). Similarly,
we can show that 
sm
G
> 
so
G
if
m
P
m
S
> ,
2
(K   v
L
) or if
m
P
m
S
< ,
4
(K   v
L
).
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Therefore, 
sm
> 
so
if any one of the following four sets of conditions are satised:
14
The comparative statics on m
S
andm
P
must be interpreted with caution because they depend on our simplifying
assumption of exogenous liquidity trading. These results may not obtain in a more general model where the trading
behavior of wealth-constrained liquidity traders is also endogenized. In such a model, an increase in m
S
(m
P
) would
induce both informed and liquidity traders to shift to the relatively more leveraged option (stock). This can improve
or worsen both market makers' adverse selection problems and cause them to set wider or narrower spreads.
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We have previously dened  
1
and  
2
. The expressions for  
3
are  
4
are as follows:
 
3
=
(1  + 2)(v
H
  v
L
) + (1  )(2  1)(v
H
 K)
(1  )(2  1)(v
H
  v
L
)[(1  )(v
H
 K) + (K   v
L
)] + 2(K   v
L
)[v
L
+ v
H
(1  )]
21
1. m
S
< ,
1
(v
H
  v
L
) and
m
P
m
S
> ,
2
(K   v
L
).
2. m
S
< ,
1
(v
H
  v
L
) and
m
P
m
S
< ,
4
(K   v
L
).
3. m
S
> ,
3
(v
H
  v
L
) and
m
P
m
S
> ,
2
(K   v
L
).
4. m
S
> ,
3
(v
H
  v
L
) and
m
P
m
S
< ,
4
(K   v
L
).
On the other hand, the sucient conditions for 
so
> 
sm
are ,
1
(v
H
  v
L
) < m
S
< ,
3
(v
H
 
v
L
) and ,
4
(K   v
L
) <
m
P
m
S
< ,
2
(K   v
L
). These conditions together imply that margin rules
improve market eciency if the stock margin and the option margin relative to the stock margin
are either large or small. But margin rules worsen market eciency if the stock and relative option
margins are moderate in size. In order to understand these results, we must recognize that both
stock and option trades contribute to market eciency. In fact, the terms
(
j
S
)
2
(1   ) + 
j
S
and
(1  
j
S
)
2
(1  )(1   ) + (1   
j
S
)
in equation (24) measure the respective contributions of the stock and
option markets to market eciency and they are increasing functions of the informed traders'
stock and option trading intensities 
j
S
and 1   
j
S
, respectively. When informed traders trade
the stock (option) more intensively, stock (option) prices become more informative while option
(stock) prices become less so and market eciency improves only if the former eect dominates
the latter. When m
S
is suciently small (large), informed traders with bad news trade the stock
(option) so aggressively given its leverage advantage that the additional informativeness of stock
(option) trades more than makes up for the reduced informativeness of option (stock) trades and
market eciency improves. Similar arguments apply for informed traders with good news when
m
P
m
S
is suciently large or small. Therefore, extreme values of m
S
and
m
P
m
S
make prices more
ecient because the stock or option market witnesses a lot of informed trading, leading to a lot of
information revelation. But when the margins are moderate, informed traders are not aggressive
in either market and trading is not as informative.
 
4
=
(K   v
L
)(v
L
+ v
H
) + (2  1)(v
H
  v
L
)[(K   v
L
)  (1  )(1  )(v
H
 K)]
(v
H
  v
L
)
2
[(v
L
+ v
H
) + (2  1)(K   v
L
) + (+    )(2  1)(v
H
 K)]
It is easy to check that  
3
and  
4
satisfy the feasibility equations (19) and (20). Furthermore, we can also show that
 
3
>  
1
and  
4
<  
2
.
22
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we modeled the impact of option trading and margin rules on the behavior of
traders with private information and on equilibrium prices. In the absence of binding margin
constraints, the introduction of option trading leads informed traders to mix between the two
markets as they seek to balance the stock's greater information sensitivity against the option's
smaller bid-ask spread. In equilibrium, the introduction of the option widens the stock's bid-ask
spread because informed traders exhibit a relative bias towards trading the stock. But with binding
margin requirements, they may no longer exhibit this bias as they tradeo the stock's information
advantage with the option's relative leverage advantage. Now, option listing shrinks (widens) the
stock's bid-ask spread if margin requirements for the stock are large (small) and those for the option
are small (large). With or without margin rules, the introduction of option trading improves market
eciency. A policy implication of our model is that regulators can improve market eciency by
setting extreme margin requirements in the stock and options markets rather than moderate ones,
i.e., by setting stock margins and relative option margins either large or small.
Some of our model's predictions are consistent with the extant empirical evidence. For example,
Jennings and Stark (1986) and Damodaran and Lim (1991) report that stock prices adjust more
quickly to information after options are listed on the underlying stocks, which is consistent with our
nding that option trading improves market eciency. The nding by Damodaran and Lim (1991),
Fedenia and Grammatikos (1992) and others that option listing leads to a decline in stock bid-ask
spreads is consistent with our model because margin requirements on options are much smaller
than those on stocks (15% vs 50% currently). Among the new, as yet untested, predictions of our
model are that stock (option) bid-ask spreads increase when stock margin requirements decrease
(increase) and when option margin requirements increase (decrease). Another new prediction of
our model is that the information content of option trades (as measured by their ability to predict
future stock price movements) is greater for options with large deltas than for those with small
deltas because informed traders prefer to trade the former.
23
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We will prove the proposition by rst deriving the equilibrium bid and ask prices taking as given
the informed traders' strategy in equation (1) and then we will show that this strategy is optimal
given the equilibrium prices.
We know that the bid price is given by B
ss
S
= E(~v j stock sale) which can be rewritten as:
B
ss
S
= E(~v j stock sale) = v
L
Pr( = L j stock sale) + v
H
Pr( = H j stock sale) (A.1)
where the conditional probabilities are derived using Bayes' rule as follows.
Pr( = L j stock sale) =
Pr( = L)Pr(stock sale j  = L)
P
H
=L
Pr()Pr(stock sale j )
(A.2)
where Pr( = L) = Pr( = H) = 0:5. When  = L(H), informed traders sell stock if they receive
bad news, which occurs with probability  (1 ). Since they comprise a fraction  of the trading
population, the probability that the market maker transacts a sell order from the informed trader
in the two states is Pr(informed stock sale j  = L) =  and Pr(informed stock sale j  = H) =
(1 ). Since liquidity traders comprise a fraction 1  of the population and since they are equally
likely to submit a buy or sell order, Pr(liquidity stock sale j  = L) = Pr(liquidity stock sale j  =
H) = (1   )=2. Therefore, we get Pr(stock sale j  = L) =  + (1   )=2 and Pr(stock sale j
 = H) = (1  ) + (1  )=2. Substituting these probabilities into equation (A.2) gives us:
Pr( = L j stock sale) =
(0:5)

+
1  
2

(0:5)

+
1  
2

+ (0:5)

(1  ) +
1  
2

=
1  + 2
2
Noting that Pr( = H j stock sale) = 1 Pr( = L j stock sale) = (1+ 2)=2 and substituting
these conditional probabilities into equation (A.1) gives us the bid price as in equation (2).
Similarly, we know that the ask price is given by:
A
ss
S
= E(~v j stock buy) = v
L
Pr( = L j stock buy) + v
H
Pr( = H j stock buy) (A.3)
Using Bayes' rule once again, we can derive the conditional probabilities in equation (A.3) as
Pr( = L j stock buy) = (1 +    2)=2 and Pr( = H j stock buy) = (1    + 2)=2. On
substituting these probabilities into equation (A.3), we get the ask price as in equation (3).
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Finally, we need only to demonstrate that the conjectured informed trader strategy in equation
(1) is optimal to complete our proof. When S = B(G), the expected prot to an informed trader
from her conjectured strategy of selling (buying) a share is B
ss
S
 E(~v j S = B) (E(~v j S = G) A
ss
S
).
We know that E(~v j S) =
P
H
=L
v

Pr( j S) for S 2 fB;Gg. Once again, we can calculate these
conditional probabilities using Bayes' rule and we get E(~v j S = B) = v
L
+ v
H
(1   ) and
E(~v j S = G) = v
H
+ v
L
(1   ). On substituting these values, we get the conjectured trading
strategy prot as B
ss
S
  E(~v j S = B) = E(~v j S = G)   A
ss
S
= (1   )(2   1)(v
H
  v
L
)=2 > 0.
This conjectured strategy is optimal if she is not better o from defecting to another strategy. The
only two available defection strategies are not trading or trading against her signal. The former
gives her zero prots and the latter gives her prots of E(~v j S = B) A
ss
S
= B
ss
S
 E(~v j S = G) =
 (1 + )(2  1)(v
H
  v
L
)=2 < 0 and so informed traders will not defect.
Proof of Lemma 1:
In order to conserve space, we will only derive the bid prices for the stock and put and note that
the ask prices are derived in an analogous manner.
As before, the stock bid price B
so
S
is given by equation (A.1) where the conditional probabilities
satisfy Bayes' rule as shown in equation (A.2). But now the possibility of an option trade changes
these conditional probabilities. In order to calculate Pr( = L j stock sale) as per equation (A.2),
note that Pr( = L) = Pr( = H) = 0:5. When  = L(H), informed traders sell stock as per
equations (7) and (8) only if their signal is S = B (probability =  (1   )) and they choose to
trade the stock (probability = 
so
B
). Since informed traders comprise a fraction , we can conclude
that Pr(informed stock sale j  = L) = 
so
B
and Pr(informed stock sale j  = H) = 
so
B
(1  ).
Irrespective of the state , a liquidity trader's stock sale is transacted only if his order reaches the
market maker (probability = 1   ), he happens to be a stock liquidity trader (probability = ),
and he wishes to sell, rather than buy, stock (probability = 0:5). Therefore, we can infer that
Pr(liquidity stock sale j  = L) = Pr(liquidity stock sale j  = H) = (1   )=2. These results
collectively imply that Pr(stock sale j  = L) = 
so
B
+ (1   )=2 and Pr(stock sale j  = H) =

so
B
(1   ) + (1  )=2. On substituting these conditional probabilities into equation (A.2) and
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simplifying, we get Pr( = L j stock sale) =
(1  ) + 2
so
B
2(1  ) + 2
so
B
and Pr( = H j stock sale) =
1   Pr( = L j stock sale) =
(1  ) + 2
B
(1  )
2(1   ) + 2
so
B
. On substituting these probabilities into
equation (A.1), we can derive B
so
S
as in equation (9).
The bid price for the put option B
so
P
is given by:
B
so
P
= E[(K   ~v)
+
j put sale) = (K   v
L
):P r( = L j put sale) + 0:P r( = H j put sale) (A.4)
since v
L
< K < v
H
. Once again, we use Bayes' rule to derive the conditional probabilities:
Pr( = L j put sale) =
Pr( = L)Pr(put sale j  = L)
P
H
=L
Pr()Pr(put sale j )
(A.5)
Using the same arguments as above, we can show that Pr(informed put sale j  = L) = (1  
)(1   
so
G
); Pr(informed put sale j  = H) = (1   
so
G
); and Pr(liquidity put sale j  = L) =
Pr(liquidity put sale j  = H) = (1   )(1   )=2. This implies that Pr(put sale j  = L) =
(1   )(1   
so
G
) + (1   )(1   )=2 and Pr(put sale j  = H) = (1  
so
G
) + (1   )(1   )=2.
These probabilities can be substituted into equation (A.5) to derive Pr( = L j put sale), which
can then be substituted into equation (A.4) to obtain B
so
P
as given in equation (11).
Proof of Proposition 2:
The informed traders choose f
so
B
; 
so
G
g in equations (7) and (8) so as to be indierent between
the two pure strategies they are mixing between. Therefore, 
so
B
is chosen in equilibrium so that
informed traders expect to make the same prots whether they sell the stock or buy the put, i.e.,
B
so
S
 E(~v j S = B) = E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = B] A
so
P
(A.6)
We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that E(~v j S = B) = v
L
+ v
H
(1   ) and we can show
that E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = B] = (K   v
L
).
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On substituting these values, the values for B
so
S
and
A
so
P
from equations (9) and (12), respectively, into equation (A.6) and solving for 
so
B
, we get the
expression as in equation (13). Similarly, we can derive 
so
G
as in equation (13) by solving
E(~v j S = G) A
so
S
= B
so
P
 E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = G] (A.7)
16
We can write E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = B] = (K   v
L
):P r( = L j S = B) + 0:P r( = H j S = B) = (K   v
L
) since
Pr( = L j S = B) =  by Bayes' rule. Similarly, we can derive E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = G] = (1   )(K   v
L
).
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In order for the mixed strategy equilibrium to exist, the mixing probabilities in equation (13) must
be feasible (lie between zero and one). We can see on inspection that they are positive and simple
algebraic manipulation tells us that 
so
B
= 
so
G
< 1 if
v
H
  v
L
K   v
L
< 1 +

(1  )
. If this inequality is
reversed, the mixing probabilities are no longer less than one and then informed traders follow the
pure strategy of trading only the stock, i.e., 
so
B
= 
so
G
= 1.
Proof of Corollary 1:
The results in this corollary can be easily proved by partially dierentiating 
so
in equation (13)
with respect to the appropriate variables as we show below:
@
so
@
=
(1  )(1   )
2
(v
H
 K)(K   v
L
) + (v
H
  v
L
)[(K   v
L
)  
2
(1  )(v
H
 K)]
[(v
H
  v
L
) + (1  )(K   v
L
)]
2
> 0
@
so
@
=  
(1   )(v
H
 K)

2
[(v
H
  v
L
) + (1  )(K   v
L
)]
< 0
@
so
@K
=  
(1  )(v
H
  v
L
)
[(v
H
  v
L
) + (1  )(K   v
L
)]
2
< 0
@
so
@
= 0
We can assign a positive sign to
@
so
@
because the condition
v
H
  v
L
K   v
L
< 1 +

(1  )
must be
satised for the mixed strategy equilibrium to exist.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The date-2 stock price P
S;t=2
is the bid priceB
so
S
or the ask priceA
so
S
, respectively, if the date-1 trade
is a stock sale or purchase. But for an option sale or purchase, P
S;t=2
= E(~v j put sale) and P
S;t=2
=
E(~v j put buy), respectively, where E(~v j put sale (buy)) = v
L
Pr( = L j put sale (buy)) +
v
H
Pr( = H j put sale (buy)). We calculated these conditional probabilities earlier using Bayes'
rule as shown in equation (A.5) and when we substitute for them, we get
E(~v j put sale) = v +
(2  1)(1   
so
)(v
H
  v
L
)
2(1  )(1   ) + 2(1   
so
)
(A.8)
E(~v j put buy) = v  
(2  1)(1   
so
)(v
H
  v
L
)
2(1  )(1   ) + 2(1   
so
)
(A.9)
We can now calculate the expected stock price on date 2 as E(P
S;t=2
) = B
so
S
:P r(stock sale) +
A
so
S
:P r(stock buy)+E(~v j put sale):P r(put sale)+E(~v j put buy):P r(put buy) where the structure
of the trading game implies that Pr(stock sale) = Pr(stock buy) = [(1   ) + 
so
]=2 and
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Pr(put sale) = Pr(put buy) = [(1 )(1  ) +(1  
so
)]=2. Substituting for these probabilities
and for the prices from equations (9), (10), (A.8) and (A.9), we get E(P
S;t=2
) = v. We can similarly
calculate the variance of P
S;t=2
and we get:
Var(P
S;t=2
) =

2
(2  1)
2
(v
H
  v
L
)
2
4
"
(
so
)
2
(1  ) + 
so
+
(1  
so
)
2
(1  )(1   ) + (1   
so
)
#
(A.10)
On substituting this expression and Var(P
S;t=3
) = (v
H
  v
L
)
2
=4 into equation (5), we get 
so
as in
equation (16). Furthermore, 
so
> 
ss
on comparing equations (6) and (16) since simple algebra
reveals that the term inside the square brackets in equation (16) exceeds one.
Proof of Proposition 4:
As before, the equilibrium values of f
sm
S
;S 2 (B;G)g are derived such that informed traders are
indierent between trading the stock or the option. Therefore, 
sm
B
satises:
B
sm
S
 E(~v j S = B)
m
S
B
sm
S
=
E [(K   ~v)
+
j S = B] A
sm
P
A
sm
P
(A.11)
where we know from before that E(~v j S = B) = v
L
+ v
H
(1   ) and E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = B] =
(K   v
L
). On substituting these values and the expressions for B
sm
S
and A
sm
P
from equations
(9) and (12), respectively, into equation (A.11) and solving for 
sm
B
, we get its equilibrium value
as shown in equation (17). Similarly, we can derive 
sm
G
as shown in equation (18) by solving the
following equation:
E(~v j S = G) A
sm
S
m
S
A
sm
S
=
B
sm
P
 E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = G]
m
P
E(~v j put sale)
(A.12)
where E(~v j S = G) = v
H
+ v
L
(1   ), E[(K   ~v)
+
j S = G] = (1   )(K   v
L
) and A
sm
S
, B
sm
P
,
and E(~v j put sale) are as shown in equations (10), (11) and (A.8), respectively.
In order for the mixed strategy equilibrium to exist, the mixing probabilities must lie between
zero and one. We can easily see from equation (17) that the necessary and sucient conditions for
0 < 
sm
B
< 1 are those in equation (19). Similarly, we can see that 0 < 
sm
G
< 1 if and only if the
conditions in equation (20) are satised.
Finally, we can easily see that the informed traders' stock returns are unambiguously greater
than (less than) their option returns when the left hand side (right hand side) inequalities in
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equations (19) and (20) are reversed, which implies that they follow the pure strategy of trading
only in the stock (option) market.
Proof of Corollary 3:
We prove the corollary by taking partial derivatives of 
sm
B
and 
sm
G
with respect to the various
parameters in equations (17) and (18), respectively. For 
sm
B
, we see that
@
sm
B
@K
=
@
sm
B
@m
P
= 0 and
@
sm
B
@
=
2m
S
v
B
(v
H
  v
L
) + (1  )[m
S
(v
L
+ v
H
)  (v
H
  v
L
)][
2
(v
H
  v
L
) m
S
v
B
(1  )
2
]
2[m
S
v
B
(1  ) + (v
H
  v
L
)]
2
@
sm
B
@
=
(1  )[m
S
(v
L
+ v
H
)  (v
H
  v
L
)]
2
2
[m
S
v
B
(1  ) + (v
H
  v
L
)]
@
sm
B
@
=
(1  )(v
H
  v
L
)f2m
S
v
H
+ (1  )[  m
S
(1  )][m
S
(v
L
+ v
H
)  (v
H
  v
L
)]g
2[m
S
v
B
(1  ) + (v
H
  v
L
)]
2
@
sm
B
@m
S
=  
(1  )(v
H
  v
L
)[(1  ) +	
1
v
B
]
2[m
S
v
B
(1  ) + (v
H
  v
L
)]
2
where 	
1
is as dened in Proposition 4 and v
B
= E(~v j S = B) = v
L
+ v
H
(1 ). On inspection,
we can see that
@
sm
B
@m
S
< 0 and
@
sm
B
@
> (<) 0 if
m
S
v
H
  v
L
> (<) (v
H
+ v
L
)
 1
. We can use the
inequalities in feasibility equation (19) to show that
@
sm
B
@
and
@
sm
B
@
as shown above are positive.
The partial derivatives of 
sm
G
in equation (18) with respect to the parameters are as follows:
@
sm
G
@
=
2m
S
m
P
v
G
(v
H
  v
L
)(K   v
L
)  (1  )(v
L
+ v
H
)(1  )[(1  )
2
  
2
]
2v
G
[(1  ) + ]
2
@
sm
G
@
=
(1  )(v
L
+ v
H
)(  1)
2
2
v
G
[(1  ) + ]
@
sm
G
@
=
(1  )(1   )(v
L
+ v
H
)(v
H
  v
L
)(  1)
2v
2
G
[(1  ) + ]
@
sm
G
@m
S
=  
(1  )[(1   )(v
L
+ v
H
) + 2v
G
]
2m
S
v
G
[(1  ) + ]
2
@
sm
G
@m
P
=
(1  )[(1   )(v
L
+ v
H
) + 2v
G
]
2m
P
v
G
[(1  ) + ]
2
@
sm
G
@K
=  
(1  )[(1   )(v
L
+ v
H
) + 2v
G
]
2v
G
(K   v
L
)[(1  ) + ]
2
where  =
m
S
(K   v
L
)
m
P
(v
H
  v
L
)
and v
G
= E(~v j S = G) = v
H
+ v
L
(1   ). On inspection, we can infer
that
@
sm
G
@m
P
is positive and
@
sm
G
@m
S
and
@
sm
G
@K
are negative. We can use the inequalities in feasibility
condition (20) to show that
@
sm
G
@
> 0. Finally, we can easily see that
@
sm
G
@
and
@
sm
G
@
are positive
(negative) if  > (<) 1.
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